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A New (mis)Interpretation of Wittgenstein?
I N HIS TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS, WITTGENSTEIN EXPOUNDS AN IMPRESsive logico-philosophical theory about language and about its relations to thinking and to reality. On the face of things, the Tractatus can be understood and studied as such a logico-semantical treatise. But Wittgenstein's work has a prima facie unexpected ending. In the penultimate section of his book Wittgenstein writes:
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands them eventually recognizes them as senseless [unsinnig] , when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them… He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. (Tractatus 6.54) These statements must be taken seriously and therefore must be interpreted as literally as possible. They have nevertheless been experienced by some philosophers as posing a major interpretational problem. For if Wittgenstein's words are taken literally, we seem to have a major problem in our hands. If what Wittgenstein said before proposition 6.54 is literally nonsense, we apparently cannot understand his book at face value. And, as was pointed out, this face value is that of a treatise in logical semantics. Hence primarily a different interpretation has to be given to the entire work-or so it has been claimed. What then is the Wittgensteinean inexpressible-which comprises apparently the bulk of his book-supposed to convey to us? Perhaps the entire Tractatus has to be understood as a series of elucidations that ultimately serve to insinuate to a receptive reader certain metaphysical and ethical insights.
This, in a nutshell, is the starting-point of the interpretation that has been self-consciously called "The New Wittgenstein." Unfortunately, But if so, Wittgenstein cannot be interpreted as trying to introduce a metaphysical vision through the back door of "showing." However "resolutely" we interpret the Tractatus, we cannot take it to put forward metaphysical views, however indirectly.
What is most conspicuously excluded according to Wittgenstein are all statements about language,or more accurately, about the meanings of the expressions of our language-that is, all propositions about how our language is related to the world and the logical relations based on these language-world relations. I will call these meaning relations semantical even though this term may be historically inaccurate (compare section 6). The inexpressible thus includes, among other things, rules of inference (5.132), truth (in the form of Frege's The True 4.442), logical forms (4.12), tautologicity (5.1362), and above all the limits of language (preface, paragraphs 3-4). This inexpressibility of semantical and logical relations according to the Tractatus was one of the main aspects of Wittgenstein's book that worried its readers in the Vienna Circle (see for example Köhler 1991, p.136 A word on terminology may be in order here. When the "New Wittgensteineans" call their reading of 6.54 "resolute," they are indulging in rhetorical trickery. Wittgenstein's book is written in German, and on a prima facie reading we have to understand their meaning in the same way as any German text. When Wittgenstein then says that the bulk of the Tractatus is nonsense, the question is not whether we should take his works "resolutely" or not, but what there is in Wittgenstein's subject matter that makes it nonsense according to his own views. And the answer to this question is given loud and clear by Wittgenstein's own words. If one wants to speak of resoluteness here, it is best shown by taking the main content of Wittgenstein's book at its obviously intended normal meaning. We have to listen to Wittgenstein as the "logician" that he told Malcolm that he was in writing the Tractatus. Such a reading is not only "resolute." It is doubly resolute. It not only takes Wittgenstein's concluding words in the Tractatus literally-it takes the entire book literally.
In a systematic perspective there nevertheless seems to remain a problem if one maintains that semantics is inexpressible while at the same time one puts forward logico-semantical views. I have highlighted this problem on earlier occasions by speaking of "semanticists without semantics." But the problem is Wittgenstein's, not his interpreters'. There is plenty of evidence (some of it reviewed below) that Wittgenstein believed in the ineffa-Jaakko Hintikka bility of semantics. From this it does not follow that an interpreter has to do the same in order to understand him.
Wittgenstein as a Member of the Ineffability Tradition IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY PREDICTABLE THAT A THINKER IN
Wittgenstein's historical situation should have thought that semantics is ineffable. In a long-range perspective, there is a trend or tradition in logical theory that maintains this ineffability. The view its members represent is variously called "logic as language" (van Heijenoort), "language as universal medium" (Hintikka, Gadamer) , the "lingua universalis" view (Leibniz, Frege), and a universalist view of logic and language (Hintikka) . This tradition is discussed in Hintikka 1997.
The universalist view owes nothing to any mystical element in Wittgenstein's thinking, any more than it is grounded on mysticism in Frege or Quine. It is an element of a perfectly sober view of language and its relation to reality. There is a strand in Wittgenstein's thought that can perhaps be called mystical, but this mysticism is neither the reason for the ineffability doctrine nor a corollary to it. The closest connection between the two is that the ineffability view opened the possibility of a certain kind of mystical stance.
In different ways and for different reasons, Wittgenstein's two main background figures, Frege and Russell, both entertained a variant of the ineffability view. It should therefore be no surprise that Wittgenstein, too, should have done so. What makes the difference between him and his predecessors and what makes his statements so striking is the boldness of his thinking and of his ways of expressing himself. (The same boldness is manifested in other views of attempted elimination of identity and his thesis of the tautological character of logical truths.) Frege and Russell had noted some of the particular problems into which the ineffability view leads in special cases, such as the indefinability of truth of simple objects (Russell) . For another instance, when Frege ran into the expressibility problem in explaining the semantical basis of his formal system, he simply appealed to his readers' antecedent understanding of what he meant. But neither of these two earlier thinkers had the temerity to raise the question of the expressibility of the entire enterprise that would later be called logical semantics. What distinguishes Wittgenstein's attitude toward the ineffability of semantics from that of his predecessors is thus not his mysticism, but his chutzpa.
One thing that this result implies is that it is futile to try to understand Wittgenstein's radical ineffability view by comparing it with the timid attempts of his predecessors to cope with particular consequences of the same view. (What Frege was doing in his comments on the concept of horse is not a concept how or on how he could only elucidate his basic concepts but not define them is a rearguard action, not a frontal assault on the problem he bequeathed to Wittgenstein.) How integrally Wittgenstein was a member of the universalist tradition is perhaps best illustrated by pointing out that a small-scale version of the ineffability view was expressed loud and clear by Russell. In his Theory of Knowledge, he maintains, among other things, the indefinability of the objects of acquaintance, which include logical forms and the inexpressibility of their existence.
Later, the ineffability of semantics was maintained by members of the Vienna Circle, admittedly in some cases-especially by Carnap-more as a methodological maxim than as a strict limitation on theoretical semantics. There was in fact a term among them for that semantical self-censorship. It was called the formal mode of speech (formale Redewise) as distinguished from the material mode of speech (inhaltiche Redeweise). It is to be noted, though, that some other members of the Vienna Circle, especially Neurath, did believe in the impossibility of logical semantics.
These uncertainties in the attitude of the Vienna Circle toward logical semantics are reflected also on the terminological level. The contrast between what was meant by "syntax" and by "semantics" was much less sharp than what it became later. For instance, in spite of its title, Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language contains concepts and arguments that we would now call semantical. Indeed, at one time he thought of calling it Semantik but was deterred from doing so by the negative attitude of his fellow members of the Circle to semantics in our sense. What is even more relevant to the saga of Wittgenstein is that all theorizing about language-world relations was considered "metaphysical" by several members of the Vienna Circle. is saying in the quoted passage is that the idea of a formal mode of speech is part and parcel of what is stated in the last few propositions of the Tractatus. Now, the Carnapian emphasis on the formale Redeweise is but a way of emphasizing the inexpressibility of semantics.
A Resolute Misreading of Wittgenstein
Thus, it is not only the case that the quoted passage fails to show that Carnap misunderstood Wittgenstein's message in the Tractatus. This passage offers conclusive evidence to the effect that Conant's overall interpretation is wrong in that the Wittgensteinian doctrine of nonsense is but a variant of the view of the ineffability of semantics.
For us, though not for Wittgenstein, what the "nonsensical" propositions of the Tractatus present is a Lehre, that is, a theory. But it is in effect a theory of meaning, and all such theories are according to Wittgenstein's lights impossible to express in language.
The poverty of the evidence that the New Wittgensteineans are presenting for their interpretation could be illustrated by other examples. It makes it difficult to discuss their views in a serious scholarly manner. Perhaps the most concise scholarly verdict on the new Wittgenstein industry can therefore be adapted from Oscar Wilde, who characterized a foxhunt as the unspeakable pursuing the uneatable. Here, we are witnessing the unspeakable pursuing the unspeakable.
Carnap's Irresolute Misunderstanding of Wittgenstein
IT TURNS OUT THAT CARNAP DID MISUNDERSTAND WITTGENSTEIN'S CLOSING REMARKS in the Tractatus, but in a way that does not help Conant in the least. In Carnap's copy of Wittgenstein's letter to Schlick cited above, he puts a question mark next to the quoted sentence. It is not hard to understand Carnap's puzzlement. Because of the confusion of syntax and semantics, Carnap took Wittgenstein to say in the Tractatus that we cannot even speak of the syntax of our language. In other words, he took Wittgenstein to deny in the Tractatus all self-referential use of language, not just to deny semantic self-reference. This is likely to be mistaken. Among other missed clues, Carnap was oblivious to the fact that it was Wittgenstein that brought to prominence the idea of a logical syntax of language. Because of this misunderstanding, Carnap thought that he was going beyond the Tractatus when he began to use methods by means of which we can speak of the purely formal (syntactical) features of language. These means were in the first place those developed by Hilbert in his metamathematics and made more explicit by Gödel in his technique of Gödel numbering. Carnap's hope initially was to use such syntactical methods to devise a universal language of science in which one could also theorize about that language itself. The Logical Syntax of Language was the best he could do to realize this dream, and he was forced to recognize the limitations of his project only by the results of Gödel and Tarski. Carnap's preference of the formal mode of speech was less an echo of the Tractatus than a lesson he had learned from Hilbert and Tarski.
However, this does not make any difference to the interpretation of Wittgenstein's words in his letter to Schlick, which incontrovertibly link his conception of the unsayable and the inexpressibility of semantics. If anything, they show that this link was so obvious to his mind that he could not help projecting it to Carnap, too.
There is No Fundamental Difference Between "Logical"
and "Metaphysical" Readings of the Tractatus WITTGENSTEIN INTERPRETATION HAS ALSO BEEN AFFLICTED BY A MISUNDERSTANDING THAT is similar to the Vienna Circle's belief that all semantics is inevitably metaphysical. Some commentators seem to think that a "logical" interpretation of the Tractatus cannot have anything to do with metaphysics, in the sense of having to do with the reality our language can be used to speak of. This kind of view is based on a radical misunderstanding of what logic and logical semantics are about. Logic does not deal only with the properties of linguistic expressions or with their relationships to each other, such as inferential relations. Everything in logic is ultimately based on the ways in which our language, prominently involving logical constants, is connected with reality, ways which enable language to represent that reality. I doubt that it is appropriate to call all discourse about reality (even in the context of logical theory) "metaphysical." But if we allow such usage, we end up saying that logic and all semantics are inextricably involved with metaphysics. For instance, any language imposes certain conditions on the kind of reality it can be used to describe.
Hence, any attempt to make an informative distinction between logical and metaphysical interpretations of the Tractatus is mistaken or at least misleading. Examples can be found aplenty to illustrate this fact.
Again, a telling example is more eloquent here than a hundred citations. An important and vivid example of this interwovenness of logic and "metaphysics" is offered by Wittgenstein's conception of logic in the Tractatus. According to a common view, logic deals with the most general features of the world. For the author of the Tractatus, logic deals with the most particular features of reality. This is because logic deals with logical forms and because all these logical forms are composed of the logical forms of simple objects. These forms do not enjoy independent existence apart from the objects whose logical forms they are. And the simple objects are of course the most particular entities that there can be. All states of affairs are combinations of such simple objects.
But such a view makes sense only on the metaphysical assumption that the reality ("world") of which Wittgenstein speaks is, objectively speaking, constituted from simple objects-simple in the sense of not being further analyzable but not simple in the sense of not having a structure.
Another metaphysical assumption that has to be recognized is that the simple objects postulated in the Tractatus are not restricted to particulars but include properties and relations. The contrary used to be maintained by the likes of Anscombe (1959) and Copi (1958) , but the publication of Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-16 and Lee (1980) put an end to this misinterpretation.
"Ethics and Semantics
Are One" ADMITTEDLY, WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS ON THE UNSAYABLE ARE CONNECTED WITH HIS ETHIcal stance. But the connection is different from what it is typically taken to be and does not gainsay the connection between semantics and ineffability. As I have suggested, Wittgenstein's leading idea was the same as Karl Kraus's. For both of them, the test case of ethical authenticity was the authenticity of language. Here, for Wittgenstein, the inexpressible internal boundaries of language that exclude what cannot be said do not have only an intellectual significance. They have also an ethical significance. They mark the limits of honest, unaffected discourse. This is what Wittgenstein means when he calls ethics transcendental, that is, something that deals with the limits of language, rather than transcendent, that is, what lies beyond those limits. Thus, the semantical theory of the Tractatus serves ipso facto ethical purposes. Wittgenstein says that "ethics and aesthetics are one" (6.421), which is not much more than an echo of G. E. Moore. He could have said more poignantly, "ethics and semantics are one." They are both inexpressible for the same reason. As I have asked elsewhere, isn't the Tractatus at bottom nothing more than a sermon on the text, "Let what you say be
